Qalibaf Weaponizes US Economic Troubles as Iran Signals Military Readiness

Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has seized on rising US Treasury yields as evidence of American economic decline, even as he simultaneously threatened military escalation if Washington refuses Tehran’s demands in ongoing negotiations.

Qalibaf’s comments on US borrowing costs – which reached 5.1 percent for 10-year Treasury bonds – represent a calculated rhetorical move aimed at domestic audiences grappling with Iran’s own economic crisis under Western sanctions. By highlighting American financial strain, the parliament speaker attempts to reframe the sanctions regime as a sign of US weakness rather than Iranian vulnerability ^[1].

Yet the dual messaging reveals deeper fissures within Iran’s leadership. In separate statements, Qalibaf criticized what he described as two competing factions: one that speaks of ending the conflict but lacks effective strategy, and another pursuing unilateral submission to enemy demands. Both approaches, he argued, have trapped Iran in permanent crisis and squandered national resources ^[2].

The escalation in rhetoric accompanied a more explicit threat. According to reports from Iranian news channels, Qalibaf stated that if Iran cannot achieve its demands through negotiation, it will resort to “the sword of power” against the United States. He emphasized that blocked Iranian funds must be returned to Tehran’s control and that the Central Bank must regain authority to issue letters of credit at will. He also signaled that the distance between diplomatic and military struggle is not as great as outsiders might assume, with “our hand on the trigger” ^[2].

This language tracks a pattern of Iranian hardline positioning as sanctions continue to constrain the economy. The rial has faced persistent pressure, inflation remains elevated, and ordinary Iranians report deepening difficulty affording housing and basic goods. By invoking American economic troubles, Qalibaf attempts to deflect attention from these domestic realities while positioning Iran as willing to escalate if negotiations stall.

The timing is significant. These statements emerged amid broader uncertainty about Iran’s negotiating posture following the post-Raisi political transition. Qalibaf, as parliament speaker, occupies a position that straddles hardliner and pragmatist camps – he can signal military resolve to satisfy principlist constituencies while maintaining channels for negotiation. Whether this represents genuine escalation risk or calibrated signaling for domestic consumption remains unclear.

The parallel economic critique – targeting US Treasury yields and fuel prices – serves a dual function: it allows Iranian officials to claim vindication of their anti-American stance while implicitly acknowledging that Iran’s own economic model remains dependent on external factors beyond its control. The regime’s ability to manage this contradiction without losing credibility with either hardliners or ordinary Iranians will shape how much room exists for diplomatic movement in coming months.

What this tells us about the regime’s stability calculus: Tehran is simultaneously preparing its population for prolonged confrontation while testing whether threats of military action might extract concessions it cannot win through economic pressure alone. The internal faction fighting Qalibaf describes suggests the regime itself is divided on whether this gambit serves Iranian interests.