Iran Doubles Down on Gulf Island Claims as UAE Presses Counterclaim at UN

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi reasserted Tehran’s claim over the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands ^[1], describing them as “inseparable parts of Iran’s territory” during the United Nations General Assembly ^[1]. The statement came in direct response to a UAE representative’s assertion that the three islands constitute “occupied territories” requiring Iranian withdrawal ^[2].

The exchange at the General Assembly represents the latest iteration of a decades-long territorial dispute with no meaningful movement toward resolution. Yet Gharibabadi’s framing – particularly his dismissal of competing claims as “baseless” and his emphasis that Iran’s sovereignty “is not subject to discussion” ^[3] – reveals something beyond routine diplomatic posturing. It signals the regime’s unwillingness to entertain any framework that might compromise control over these strategically vital positions.

The three islands sit approximately 20 kilometers south of Iran’s Qeshm Island in the eastern Persian Gulf ^[4], positioned near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran administers them as part of Hormozgan province ^[4], though the UAE has long contested their sovereignty. The geographic placement matters enormously: control over these waters intersects with Iran’s ability to project power through the strait and monitor shipping traffic in one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

Gharibabadi’s recent statements on the Strait of Hormuz itself provide context for understanding why these islands matter to Tehran’s strategic calculus. In July 2026, he asserted that Iran must control the entire strait “for national security reasons,” even while acknowledging Oman’s traditional role in the waterway ^[5]. That claim – that wartime conditions justify exclusive Iranian dominion over international waters – suggests the regime views these island disputes through a security lens far broader than mere territorial pride.

The UAE’s counter-position at the General Assembly maintains that the three islands represent “occupation” requiring resolution ^[2]. Yet neither side has shown flexibility in bilateral negotiations, and international mediation efforts have stalled. The ritual repetition of these claims at the UN serves multiple functions for Tehran: it reinforces the regime’s narrative for domestic audiences, maintains the dispute’s profile in international forums, and signals to regional actors that Iran will not yield on positions it frames as existential to national security.

What distinguishes Gharibabadi’s recent posture from earlier iterations is the hardening language around non-negotiability. By insisting Iran’s sovereignty over the islands is “not subject to discussion,” the regime forecloses the diplomatic space that might otherwise exist for creative solutions. This aligns with broader Iranian strategic messaging under current leadership: resistance to international frameworks perceived as constraining, emphasis on unilateral control over vital geography, and framing of concessions as capitulation to external pressure.

The timing – during a General Assembly session where multiple regional powers air grievances – also reflects Iran’s broader effort to position itself as a wronged party facing external aggression rather than as a claimant in a bilateral dispute. Gharibabadi has spent recent months accusing Europe of complicity in US aggression against Iran and rejecting Western invocations of international law as selective and hypocritical ^[6]. In that rhetorical context, the island dispute becomes another example of how the West and its regional allies allegedly weaponize international institutions against Tehran.