Iran’s Zarif Signals Renewed South Caucasus Diplomacy as Tehran Courts Armenia

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s vice president for strategic affairs, told Armenia’s foreign minister that Tehran is prepared to deepen dialogue on South Caucasus stability, signaling a diplomatic push that underscores the regime’s effort to reassert influence in a region where Russian and Azerbaijani interests have dominated since the 2020 war.

Zarif’s statement came during talks with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in Tehran on October 5, where the two officials discussed multilateral cooperation frameworks and infrastructure projects, according to regional reports ^[1]. The Iranian official emphasized Tehran’s willingness to participate in the ‘3+3’ format – a six-nation dialogue mechanism that includes Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia alongside Iran.

The timing reveals Tehran’s strategic calculus in a region where its leverage has contracted. Russia has consolidated military presence through its peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, has reasserted control over territories lost to Armenia in the 1990s. Iran, bordered by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, has watched its influence erode as Moscow and Baku align more closely.

Zarif’s engagement signals the regime’s intent to position itself as a counterbalance. During the talks, Iranian and Armenian officials discussed concrete projects: a second bridge across their shared border, power transmission lines, and transport corridors that would deepen economic interdependence. These infrastructure proposals serve dual purposes – they strengthen bilateral ties while potentially creating leverage against Azerbaijan’s dominance of regional trade routes.

The Armenian visit reflects a broader Iranian diplomatic strategy in the South Caucasus. In September, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Galuzin met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Sobhani to coordinate positions on the region, with both powers reaffirming interest in the ‘3+3’ format and joint infrastructure initiatives ^[2]. That alignment suggests Russia and Iran are attempting to preserve influence through economic integration rather than military posturing.

But the dynamic remains precarious. Azerbaijan views Iranian-Armenian ties with suspicion, particularly infrastructure projects that could bypass Azerbaijani territory and reduce Baku’s control over regional commerce. Turkey, Azerbaijan’s close ally, has its own strategic interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran’s diplomatic opening to Armenia, therefore, operates in a crowded field where missteps risk escalation.

Zarif’s role amplifies the significance of these talks. As a career diplomat who negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, his appointment as vice president for strategic affairs in August 2024 signals the regime’s intent to pursue engagement on multiple fronts. Yet his presence in these regional talks also reflects the constraints on Iranian power – the regime must rely on diplomatic skill and economic incentives rather than military capacity to shape outcomes in its own neighborhood.

The Armenian foreign minister’s visit to Tehran, including a meeting with Iran’s president, underscores how seriously the regime takes this outreach. Yet the real test lies ahead: whether infrastructure projects and diplomatic forums can offset the structural advantages that Russia’s military presence and Azerbaijan’s Turkish backing provide in determining the region’s trajectory.