Iran’s Security Council Delays U.S. Deal as Ghalibaf Signals Hardline Resistance

Iranian negotiators are waiting for final approval from the Supreme National Security Council on a potential agreement with the United States, brokered through Oman, but the delay reflects deeper fractures within Tehran’s leadership over how much ground to concede on the nuclear file.

Mohammad Ghalibaf, Speaker of Parliament and head of Iran’s negotiation delegation, publicly derided the Trump administration’s approach on August 7, stating in English: “We don’t need more theater.” The message accompanied accusations that the U.S. is using “bullying, broken promises, and fake news as leverage” – a pointed signal that Iran’s hardline faction views current U.S. proposals as inadequate ^[1].

The timing is significant. Ali Larijani, recently confirmed as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Khamenei on August 5, now controls the institutional mechanism that must green-light any agreement. Larijani’s appointment itself signals an attempt by Pezeshkian to centralize diplomatic authority, but it also means the security council – traditionally a venue for factional compromise – has become the final checkpoint where hardliners can stall or reshape terms.

U.S. officials have suggested willingness to accept limited Iranian uranium enrichment as part of a broader accord ^[2]. But Ghalibaf’s public rejection of what he frames as theatrical negotiation tactics suggests the principlist faction views even modest enrichment caps as unacceptable constraints on Iran’s nuclear sovereignty. The gap between what Trump’s team appears willing to offer and what Tehran’s hardliners will accept has widened precisely as the security council gained new leadership.

Oman’s role as intermediary has intensified over recent months, with diplomatic channels between Tehran and Muscat described as operating at heightened intensity ^[3]. The sultanate has also proposed a fee system for Strait of Hormuz transit, a proposal that would require Iranian acceptance to function – another leverage point in negotiations ^[4].

What this tells us about the regime’s stability calculus: Pezeshkian’s appointment of Larijani suggests the president believes he needs a trusted operator to manage both factional pressures and direct negotiations. Yet Ghalibaf’s public posturing indicates the hardline bloc retains enough institutional power to force delays and shape outcomes. The security council’s approval process has become less a rubber stamp and more a genuine decision point – which means Tehran is unlikely to move quickly toward any agreement that its principlist faction views as compromising Iran’s nuclear program. The delay itself is the message: Iran’s leadership remains divided on whether the current international environment permits meaningful concessions.