Iraq’s Air Defense Gambit: How Baghdad Balances Tehran’s Influence and Sovereignty Claims

Iraq’s government announced ^[1][2] it will purchase a complete air defense system to assert full airspace sovereignty while simultaneously legislating the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the country’s security apparatus under the command of the armed forces chief. The dual initiative, announced by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on October 1, exposes a strategic tension that has defined Iraqi security policy for years: how to arm the state while the most powerful armed actors remain Tehran-aligned militias nominally under state control.

The air defense procurement addresses a genuine vulnerability. Iraqi airspace has been repeatedly penetrated by Israeli strikes targeting Iranian positions and Iraqi militia weapons depots. By acquiring integrated air defense capabilities, Baghdad signals it wants to reduce dependence on ad-hoc militia responses and establish a state monopoly on air security. Yet the announcement comes as the government moves to formally institutionalize the PMF – the network of militias that grew from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards apparatus and have repeatedly resisted disarmament efforts.

The PMF law represents the codification of a force that has operated in the gray space between state and proxy for over a decade. ^[3] Al-Zaidi committed in September 2026 to disarming Iranian-backed proxy groups by June 2027, a pledge that collides directly with this month’s decision to enshrine the PMF within the security framework. The move suggests Baghdad is abandoning disarmament as a goal and instead pursuing integration – absorbing the militias into formal command structures rather than dismantling them.

This reflects the reality on the ground. ^[4] The PMF has demonstrated sustained counterterrorism capability, repelling Islamic State infiltration attempts near Kirkuk even as it remains Tehran-influenced. Iraqi officials face a choice between two unpalatable options: attempt genuine disarmament and risk destabilizing security in the interior, or accept the PMF as a permanent feature and seek to channel its loyalties toward Baghdad rather than Tehran.

The air defense purchase is Baghdad’s attempt at the latter strategy. By acquiring state-of-the-art systems, Iraq signals it will no longer need to rely on Iranian air defenses or militia responses to Israeli strikes. The procurement becomes a tool for reducing asymmetric dependence on Tehran – Iraq gets the capability to defend itself, theoretically reducing the need for Iranian intervention. But without actual disarmament of the PMF, the militias retain the ability to trigger the very airspace incursions that justify the air defense system’s existence.

The timing matters. ^[5] Al-Zaidi marked October 1 as the serious start to addressing weapons outside state control, language that suggests momentum toward enforcement. Yet the PMF legislation moves in the opposite direction, formalizing rather than constraining these forces. Baghdad is attempting to have both: sovereignty through military procurement and stability through militia integration. Whether that balance holds depends on whether the PMF accepts subordination to the armed forces commander or continues to answer ultimately to Tehran.