Netanyahu’s Office Denies Atlantic Report on Egyptian Warning Before October 7

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office issued a categorical denial ^[1] on September 26 of allegations published by The Atlantic that Egypt had warned Israel of an imminent Hamas attack eleven days before October 7, 2023. The statement represents a sharp escalation in Israel’s pushback against reporting that has circulated internationally since September 8 ^[2].

According to The Atlantic’s investigation, Major General Abbas Kamel ^[2] – who served as Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate until 2024 ^[3] – made a secret visit to Ben Gurion Airport on September 26, 2023, arriving aboard a Cessna aircraft that landed in a restricted diplomatic zone. The report claimed Kamel warned Israeli officials that Hamas appeared to be mobilizing for a major attack and recommended economic concessions to prevent conflict ^[4].

Netanyahu’s office statement was unequivocal ^[1]: “The claim is false. It was denied at the time, and is being circulated now in order to mislead Israeli public opinion.” The statement added that Egypt officially denied on October 11, 2023 – four days after the attack – that it had issued any such warning. It further asserted that in the months before October 7, Netanyahu “did not meet or speak” with Kamel, and that no Israeli intelligence agency briefed the Prime Minister on such a warning ^[1].

The timing and specificity of the denial carries institutional weight. Netanyahu’s office emphasized that the Egyptian government’s own October 2023 denial was contemporaneous, not retroactive – a detail that shifts the narrative from Israeli obfuscation to Egyptian denial. The statement also noted that “lies will not become truth, no matter how many times people repeat them” ^[1] – language that suggests the Israeli government views the Atlantic story as part of a coordinated campaign to undermine confidence in the government’s pre-attack intelligence assessment.

This dispute sits at the intersection of three separate intelligence accountability questions. First, it concerns what warning signals existed before October 7 and who received them. Second, it raises the question of whether Egypt’s own position – that it issued no warning – is consistent with its intelligence operations. Third, it touches on the October 7 investigation itself, which has become a proxy battle over civil-military relations and ministerial oversight in Israel.

The Atlantic report had cited multiple officials – Israeli, Egyptian, Arab, American, and European – as sources familiar with Kamel’s alleged visit. The specificity of those claims (the aircraft type, the airport zone, the timing relative to Netanyahu’s Yom Kippur War commemoration speech) gave the story institutional credibility that a flat denial alone may not dispel.

What this means for the coalition math: The denial creates a new pressure point on Netanyahu’s right flank. If the Atlantic’s sourcing holds, the government’s categorical rejection looks like a cover-up; if the denial holds, it suggests a coordinated foreign media campaign to damage the government ahead of elections. Either scenario feeds the narrative of institutional dysfunction that has animated Israeli politics since October 7. The dispute also complicates Israel’s relationship with Egypt at a moment when Gaza ceasefire negotiations depend on Cairo’s mediation – a detail the government’s statement conspicuously avoided addressing.