Sana’a Reports 198 Ships Through Bab el-Mandeb as Traffic Patterns Shift

The Yemeni government in Sana’a reported that 198 commercial vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait over five days in late September, according to local reports ^[1]. The statement emphasized continued maritime traffic through the strategic waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean ^[2], while acknowledging that some ships may not appear on radar due to disabled tracking systems.

The claim warrants scrutiny against the broader pattern of Red Sea shipping disruptions. Earlier in September, the same Yemeni ministry reported 408 commercial ships passing through the strait over a 10-day period from September 11-21 ^[3], which would average roughly 40 vessels daily. The 198-ship figure over five days represents approximately 40 vessels per day as well ^[1], suggesting consistency in reported traffic flows.

Yet these figures sit in sharp contrast to documented shipping patterns. Red Sea traffic has hit 18-month lows as Houthi attacks force vessels to reroute around Africa ^[4], with major shipping lines diverting away from the chokepoint entirely. The gap between Sana’a’s traffic claims and actual global shipping data suggests the government is counting vessels it permits to pass – not the full volume that would transit an unimpeded strait.

The Sana’a government’s statement contained a notable exclusion: maritime navigation remains safe “for all international ships except Saudi-aligned vessels” ^[1]. This framing reveals the operating reality. The Houthi-aligned administration functions as a gatekeeper rather than a neutral administrator of international waters. Saudi oil tankers have been rerouted as Houthis enforce what amounts to a selective blockade ^[5], while the government claims normal flow continues for approved traffic.

The acknowledgment that disabled tracking devices inflate actual vessel numbers ^[1] introduces another layer of opacity. Ships with transponders switched off cannot be independently verified, meaning the Sana’a figures rely entirely on government observation and reporting – data that serves political purposes.

This maritime control extends Iran’s broader proxy coordination across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthi movement’s enhanced grip on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait represents a strategic shift in the balance of power along Arabian Sea shipping routes ^[6]. As Saudi energy infrastructure faces pressure – including the shutdown of east-west pipelines due to Houthi operations ^[7] – the strait functions as both a chokepoint and a leverage point in the wider proxy conflict between Iran-aligned forces and the Saudi-led coalition.

The Sana’a government’s traffic announcements serve multiple purposes: they signal operational control to domestic audiences, they stake a claim to international legitimacy as administrators of vital waterways, and they attempt to normalize conditions that remain fundamentally disrupted for global shipping. The real measure of the strait’s status lies not in Sana’a’s selective traffic counts, but in the shipping routes being abandoned and the energy supplies being rerouted.