Shin Bet Warned Netanyahu of Hamas Escalation a Month Before October 7, Eisenkot Reveals

Gadi Eisenkot, head of the Yesh Atid party and a former IDF chief of staff, disclosed that Israel’s internal security agency warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approximately one month before the October 7 attack that Hamas was preparing a significant escalatory operation in Gaza ^[1]. According to Eisenkot’s account, the Shin Bet recommended preemptive military action against the terrorist organization, but Netanyahu rejected the advice ^[1].

The disclosure emerged during a media briefing on September 26, 2026 ^[1][2], adding to an accumulating body of evidence about intelligence assessments available to Israeli decision-makers before the attack. The revelation surfaces a critical juncture in the chain of command: what intelligence was available, who received it, and why certain recommended responses were not pursued.

This is not the first indication that Israeli officials possessed warning indicators before October 7. In March 2025, the Shin Bet released an internal assessment acknowledging specific failures in preventing the attack ^[3]. Additionally, reporting has indicated that the United Arab Emirates provided intelligence to Israeli officials warning of potential Hamas action in the weeks preceding the assault ^[4].

The timing of Eisenkot’s disclosure carries weight within Israel’s ongoing political and institutional reckoning. As a sitting opposition leader and former military figure with direct credibility on defense matters, his account carries institutional authority that shapes how the Knesset and public evaluate Netanyahu’s judgment during the critical pre-attack period. The revelation also intersects with broader questions about civilian-military coordination and the decision-making processes that govern Israel’s response to terrorist threats.

The Shin Bet’s recommendation for preemptive action, if accurate, would have represented the agency’s professional assessment of the threat level and the operational window available to disrupt Hamas planning. Netanyahu’s refusal to act on that advice – the rationale for which remains unexplained in public statements – stands as a discrete decision point that will likely feature in any comprehensive institutional review of October 7.

What this means for the coalition math: the disclosure provides ammunition to opposition figures scrutinizing Netanyahu’s leadership and raises pressure on coalition partners to address accountability questions before the next election cycle. For the Shin Bet itself, the public attribution of its pre-attack warning establishes institutional distance from the failure, positioning the agency as having identified the threat correctly but lacking decision-making authority to act on it.